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Abstract:  
Decision no 3220/2017 of Piraeus’ Single-member Court of First Instance is of historical 
significance for two converging reasons. First, because it is the only known case since the 
ratification of the Revised European Social Charter by Greece in which a Greek court applies 
article 24 of the Charter on a dismissal case. The second reason is linked to the fact that, in its 
basic premise, the Court of Piraeus takes the view, for the first time in the history of the 
Greek labour jurisprudence, that, pursuant to article 24, in order for a dismissal to be lawful, it 
has to be grounded on a valid reason, which must be invoked before the court and then be 
proven by the employer. Provided that the Greek Supreme Court espouses this viewpoint, 
Piraeus’ ruling has the potential to radically alter the physiognomy of the Greek dismissal law 
by introducing an objective system of protection against arbitrary dismissals. 
 
Resume: 
L’arrêt n ° 3220/2017 du Tribunal de Première Instance de Pirée est d’une importance 
marquante pour deux raisons convergentes. Premièrement, parce qu’il est le premier cas de la 
jurisprudence hellénique, rendue après la ratification par la Grèce de la Charte sociale 
européenne révisée, qui a appliqué l'article 24 de la Charte dans une affaire de licenciement. 
Et, deuxièmement, parce que dans cet arrêt le Tribunal de Première Instance de Pirée a estimé 
pour la première fois en Grèce que, conformément à l'article 24 de la Charte, pour qu'un 
licenciement soit qualifié licite, il doit être fondé sur une cause valable qui, une fois invoquée 
devant le tribunal, elle doit être prouvée par l'employeur. Si la Cour de Cassation hellénique 
adopte la solution précitée, l’arrêt n° 3220/2017 du Tribunal de Première Instance de Pirée 
contribuera de façon décisive à la modification du droit grec des licenciements car il 
introduira dans l’ordre juridique hellénique un système objectif de protection contre tout 
licenciement arbitraire. 
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1. Decision no 3220/2017 of Piraeus’ Single-member Court of First Instance is 
undoubtedly of historical significance. And this is so for two converging reasons: To start 
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with, this is the first time since the ratification of the Revised European Social Charter by 
Greece (20.1.2016) that a Greek court applies article 24 of the Charter on a dismissal case; 
and it does so both directly and horizontally, in a case between two private parties. The 
second, contiguous reason which attaches tremendous importance to this ruling is that, in its 
basic premise, the Court of Piraeus takes the view —for the first time in the history of the 
Greek labour jurisprudence— that in order for a dismissal to be lawful, it has to be grounded 
on a valid reason, which, on top of that, must be invoked before the court and then be proven 
by the employer1. 
As it will be schematically shown in the following few pages, the ratification of the 
Revised European Social Charter, along with the ratio decidendi of the said Court’s ruling, 
has a strong potential to stimulate a major shift in the Greek law and jurisprudence regulating 
employees’ protection against arbitrary termination of their employment contract. 
2. Since its very early days, Greek labour law has never enshrined any ad hoc 
substantial legislative protection against the termination of an open-ended employment 
contract on the employer’s initiative. Instead, what the Greek labour legislation has always 
been familiar with is procedural rules that, establishing some standards of minimum justice2, 
stipulate certain formalities upon which the validity of a dismissal depends. 
In particular, under Greek legislation, for a termination of an open-ended employment 
contract to be lawful, four preconditions should be met: i) the termination of the contract must 
be handed to the employee in writing; ii) a period of notice before the termination of the 
employment must be kept; iii) the employee being dismissed must be granted a severance 
allowance, the sum of which doubles in case the employer omits to keep the aforementioned 
notice period (in this case, the severance allowance also embeds a compensation in lieu of 
notice)3; and iv) the employee who is being dismissed must have been insured, or at least 
registered, at the Unified Social Security Institution (EFKA). 
If even one of these formal preconditions is not met, the termination of the 
employment contract is null and void. And reversely: the dismissal is, in principle, valid 
provided that the above mentioned preconditions are met. 
3. Leaving aside certain legislative provisions appertaining to limited categories of 
employees who are in need of enhanced protection (e.g. legislation regarding trade union 
officials or female employees under maternity protection, or forbidding discriminatory 
dismissals), a general substantive protection of every employee against arbitrary dismissals is 
only being achieved through article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, which forbids the abusive 
exercise of rights. Putting it into the frame of labour law, this legislative provision has the 
meaning that an employer is not allowed to exercise his/her4 right to terminate an employment 
contract in an abusive manner. 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of this court Decision see C. Tsimpoukis, ‘End of Story for the Non-causal Dismissal? Piraeus’ 
Court of First Instance Applies Article 24 of the Revised European Social Charter and Inaugurates a New Era for 
the Greek Labour Law’ [Αρχή του τέλους για την «αναιτιώδη» εργοδοτική καταγγελία; Το Πρωτοδικείο Πειραιώς 
εφαρμόζει το άρθρο 24 του Αναθεωρημένου Ε.Κ.Χ. και εγκαινιάζει μια νέα εποχή για το ελληνικό δίκαιο των 
απολύσεων], Labour Law Review 76 (2017) [ΕΕργΔ 2017], p. 1395 et seq., wherein extensive citation of the 
Greek legal theory and case law. 
2 See D. Vassiliou, ‘The Impact of Article 24 of the Revised European Social Charter on the Greek Dismissal 
Law’ [Το άρθρο 24 του Αναθεωρημένου Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινωνικού Χάρτη και η επίδρασή του στο ελληνικό δίκαιο 
της καταγγελίας], Labour law Review 76 (2017) [ΕΕργΔ 2017], p. 881. 
3 The sum of the severance allowance owed depends, cumulatively, on the employee’s years of previous service 
and on the amount of his/her salary at the last month of employment. 
4 Henceforth, any reference to a person of the male sex should also be read as a reference to a person of the female 
sex. 
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The first ruling of the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) applying article 281 C.C. 
on a dismissal case dates back to 19475, namely the year that followed the entry into force of 
the Greek Civil Code. However, in the decades that followed the Civil Code’s enactment, 
Greece, by stark contrast to what happened in most European countries during the post-War 
period, never adopted a legislation explicitly making the dismissal’s validity conditional on 
the existence of a real and just cause, linked to the conduct or competence of the employee, or 
to the operational needs of the enterprise. As a result, Greek civil courts6, finding themselves 
in such a legislative void, have always leaned heavily on article 281 C.C. when dealing with 
dismissal cases, thus building an almost entirely judge made law for a universal yet inefficient 
protection against arbitrary dismissals. 
4. Under this jurisprudential regime of abusive dismissal, an employer is in principle 
free to terminate an employment contract at will. No valid reason justifying the dismissal is 
needed. However, the dismissal is deemed abusive, and thus null and void, if the employer 
reaches his decision to terminate the employment contract motivated by reprehensible or 
vindictive incentives, or by his hatred towards the employee, stemming from a lawful yet 
distasteful to the employer act or behaviour on the part of the employee. Typical examples of 
abusive/vengeful dismissals are those taking place as a response to the employee’s standing 
for his statutory or contractual rights: e.g. an employee is fired because he asked to be paid 
the overtime work he has provided, or asked for his annual paid leave, or reported a violation 
of the labour legislation to the Labour Inspectorate, etc. 
What is noteworthy here is that, according to Areios Pagos’ well-established case 
law7, a dismissal that is not grounded on a just cause and cannot be objectively justified is not 
deemed abusive by default. Contrariwise, in order for a dismissal to be regarded as abusive, it 
has to be the result of the employer’s hatred, or to stem from his reprehensible and vindictive 
incentives. If those incentives are not invoked in the law suit and then proven by the 
dismissed employee before the court, the termination of the employment contract will be 
deemed valid. And this is so even if the employer, facing the plaintiff’s allegations, refuses to 
invoke any cause for the effectuated dismissal, or even invokes a reason that is obviously 
untrue or deceitful. 
Indeed, according to the procedural law rules concerning the application of article 
281 C.C. in unfair dismissal trials, the burden of proof rests completely with the employee, 
who bears the onus not only to invoke the reason rendering the dismissal abusive, but also to 
prove the abuse before the court — or see his law suit being rejected. Thus, although in most 
cases the employer, not wishing to negatively bias the court, will usually allege a credible 
reason for his decision to terminate the employment contract, in principle he may as well 
merely deny the plaintiff’s allegations without presenting a single reason for the dismissal at 
issue. 
                                                 
5 Decision no 34/1947 of the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos), Labour Law Review 6 (1947) [ΕΕργΔ 1947], 
p. 246. 
6 The Greek legal system knows no special labour courts. All employment disputes are thus resolved by common 
civil courts, staffed by judges who only exceptionally and fortuitously have an expertise in the field of labour 
law. This lack of both labour courts and specialised judges is one of the factors greatly responsible for the current 
misfortune of the Greek labour law. 
7 See purely indicatively Areios Pagos no 769/2016, Labour Law Review 2017 (EErgD 2017), p. 389; Areios 
Pagos no 1422/2015 EErgD 2016, p. 595; Areios Pagos no 460/2013 EErgD 2013, p. 744; Areios Pagos no 
512/2012 EErgD 2013, p. 692; Areios Pagos no 50/2011 EErgD 2011, p. 943; Areios Pagos no 283/2009 EErgD 
2010, p. 47; Areios Pagos no 625/2008 EErgD 2009, p. 508; Areios Pagos no 851/2005; Areios Pagos no 326/2001 
EErgD 2002, p. 917. 
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5. Besides the above, according to the Greek case law, there are two more occasions 
on which a termination of an employment contract may be deemed abusive pursuant to article 
281 C.C. Both of them concern, more or less, dismissals effectuated on economic grounds. 
In the first occasion, which arises strictly in cases of economic dismissals, an 
employer shall be found to have terminated the employment contract abusively if he fails to 
properly apply the pertinent social and economic criteria when deciding which of his 
redundant employees to fire8. 
The second occasion is related to the employer’s omission to apply the principle of 
ultima ratio. According to this principle, before proceeding to the termination of an 
employment contract, which is regarded to be employer’s last resort, the employer must first 
seek for alternative, less onerous to the employee measures, which, if adopted, could result to 
the avoidance of the dismissal. Although Greek legal theory suggests that the ultima ratio 
principle should be applicable in all kinds of dismissals9, Greek case law has only very rarely 
and wholly inconsistently applied this principle in cases of dismissals connected with the 
employee’s conduct or capacity. Therefore, in practice, an abusive termination of the 
employment contract due to violation of the ultima ratio principle will arise merely in cases 
of economic dismissals. 
6. According to the vast majority of Greek labour law scholars, the aforementioned 
judicial interpretation of article 281 C.C. in unfair dismissal cases is unduly and absurdly 
narrow. In their view, interpreting the notion of abusive dismissal in such a restrictive manner 
is incompatible with the Greek Constitution, whose article 22 para. 1 explicitly guarantees the 
right to work. Since both the protection against arbitrary dismissals and the job protection per 
se derive from the right to work, the majority view in the Greek legal theory espouses the 
standpoint that courts should deem abusive any dismissal that is not grounded on a true, 
serious and valid reason related to the employee’s conduct or capacity, or to the operational 
needs of the undertaking10. 
However, this perspective, no matter how deep and persuasive in its analysis, has not 
been able to influence the jurisprudence of the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos). On the 
contrary, over the last two decades Areios Pagos has been persistently interpreting the 
concept of abusive dismissal in an increasingly narrow manner, thus making the protection of 
employees against arbitrary dismissals even weaker than it already was11. 
7. It is true though that the high sums of severance allowance to which the (lawfully) 
dismissed employees had been entitled until 2010 could in some cases practically blunt the 
absence of a legal provision directly protecting the employment position. But even when this 
protection was achieved, it was so only indirectly, in the sense that employers, especially 
those running small businesses, would think twice before deciding to terminate an 
employment contract. In other words, because of the high severance allowances that applied 
                                                 
8 This was the case in the aforementioned ruling of the year 1947 (see above, footnote no 5) in which Areios Pagos 
applied article 281 C.C. on a dismissal case. 
9 See among others D. Zerdelis, The Dismissal as Ultima Ratio [Η απόλυση ως ultima ratio], 1991, passim. 
10 See among many D. Zerdelis, The Dismissal as Ultima Ratio [Η απόλυση ως ultima ratio], 1991, passim; idem, 
Employment Law [Εργατικό Δίκαιο], 2015, p. 989-990; I. Koukiadis, Employment Law [Ατομικό Εργατικό 
Δίκαιο], 2017, p. 39, F. Dermitzaki, ‘The Judicial Scrutiny of Dismissals’ [Ο δικαστικός έλεγχος της καταγγελίας 
της σύμβασης εργασίας αορίστου χρόνου], Labour Law Review 70 (2011) [ΕΕργΔ 2011], p. 881 et seq. For an 
opposite opinion see I. Lixouriotis, Employment Law [Ατομικές Εργασιακές Σχέσεις], 2017, p. 770-771, 781-783, 
K. Bakopoulos, The Termination of the Employment Contract [Η καταγγελία της σύμβασης εργασίας], 2012, p. 
87-92. 
11 See above, footnote no 7. 
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until 2010, small and medium employers were at some extent deterred from proceeding to 
completely unreflective dismissals12. However, even this oblique protection of the work 
position was drastically diminished in 2010, and then more severely in 2012, when, due to the 
MoU emergency legislation, the severance allowance payable to the employees in case of a 
lawful dismissal was dramatically shrunk in the lowest ranks since its enactment in 192013. 
But, either way, the ratio of the severance allowance is neither to deter the employer from 
effectuating dismissals nor to be a sanction imposed upon the employer in case of an arbitrary 
dismissal. Severance allowance is due only in cases of a lawful dismissal, constituting a 
deferred wage offered to the employee at the end of the employment contract. 
Supplementarily, it also serves as a means of relieving the dismissed employee from the 
consequences of his unemployment, in parallel with the unemployment benefit provided by 
the State14. 
8. Within the above described legislative and judicial frame, people working in post-
crisis Greece found themselves in the worst position ever as regards their protection against 
dismissals. With no explicit legislative provision directly shielding the job position, with a far 
too restrictive judicial interpretation of the notion of abusive dismissal, with the severance 
allowance in case of a lawful dismissal at record low levels, with the collective labour law 
amputated and the coverage from collective agreements in a historical nadir, a serious 
protection of the job position was unfeasible even in an indirect way. As a result, the core aim 
of dismissal law was practically eradicated — that is if one accepts that its aim is to raise 
collective wages and to not allow the perpetual swapping of employees in the same job 
position by preventing them from becoming the lowest bidders for a constantly contestable 
job position15. 
9. And then came the Revised European Social Charter, whose article 24 reads: 
«With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to protection in cases 
of termination of employment, the Parties undertake to recognise: 
a) the right of all workers not to have their employment terminated without valid reasons for 
such termination connected with their capacity or conduct or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service; 
b) the right of workers whose employment is terminated without a valid reason to adequate 
compensation or other appropriate relief. 
To this end the Parties undertake to ensure that a worker who considers that his employment 
has been terminated without a valid reason shall have the right to appeal to an impartial 
body»16. 
Given that the Greek Constitution, following the monistic model of incorporating 
international treaties into the national legal order, establishes the supremacy of international 
law over national legislation, the Charter prevails over ordinary statutory legislation (as is 
                                                 
12 D. Vassiliou, op.cit., p. 883. 
13 F. Dermitzaki, op.cit., p. 891.  
14 On the legislative purpose of severance allowance in the Greek labour law see C. Tsimpoukis, op.cit., p. 1414-
1418, wherein further citation. 
15 Cf. D. Zerdelis, ‘Abusive Dismissal in the Light of the Recent Areios Pagos’ case law’ [Η καταχρηστική 
απόλυση υπό το φως της πρόσφατης νομολογίας του Αρείου Πάγου], in: The ‘New’ Labour Law [Το «νέο» 
Εργατικό Δίκαιο] - Essays in Honour of Professor Ioannis Koukiadis, p. 325 et seq.; D. Vassiliou, EErgD 2017, p. 
548. 
16 For a detailed analysis of article 24 of the Revised E.S.C. see M. Schmitt, ‘Article 24: The Right to Protection in 
Cases of Termination of Employment’, in: N. Bruun / K. Lörcher / I. Schömann / S. Clauwaert (eds), The 
European Social Charter and the Employment Relation, 2017, p. 412 et seq. 
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article 281 of the Civil Code). The Charter’s supremacy, along with the fact that its article 24a 
is unconditional and sufficiently precise, led part of the Greek legal theory to support that, 
upon the Charter’s ratification, the physiognomy of the Greek dismissal law was 
automatically and utterly transformed17. In other words, according to this viewpoint, the 
judicial interpretation of article 281 C.C. as regards the concept of abusive dismissal holds no 
validity any more. And this is so because article 24a of the Revised Charter, being a self-
executing provision, has already introduced an objective system of protection against 
arbitrary dismissals, without the immediate need of taking any further legislative measures. 
According to this new dismissal system, the termination of an employment contract 
on the employer’s initiative may only be deemed valid if it is grounded on a just cause 
associated with the employee’s capacity or conduct, or based on the operational requirements 
of the undertaking, establishment or service. 
Moreover, since under this new scheme the existence of a valid reason constitutes a 
prerequisite for the dismissal’s lawfulness, the burden of proof is now reversed. Accordingly, 
the employer is now the one burdened with the onus to prove that the dismissal was 
effectuated on a valid reason, whereas the employee need only allege in his law suit that the 
dismissal was ungrounded. 
10. This viewpoint was fully endorsed by the Single-Member First Instance Court of 
Piraeus in its Decision no 3220/2017, which can potentially signify a new era for the Greek 
dismissal law system. And this is so despite that fact that the Court of Piraeus failed to 
complete the breakthrough it commenced in its basic premise, since its final judgment on 
what consists a valid reason is open to criticism and further contemplation. What is important 
though is that the first step for the application of article 24 of the Revised European Social 
Charter in the Greek legal order has been made. Now it is up to Areios Pagos to pick up the 
baton and finally alter its obsolete jurisprudence. ▓ 
                                                 
17 N. Gavalas, ‘What Changes in the Greek Labour Law after the Ratification of the Revised European Social 
Charter’ [Τι αλλάζει στο εργατικό δίκαιο μετά την κύρωση του Αναθεωρημένου Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινωνικού Χάρτη], 
Labour Law Review 75 (2016) [ΕΕργΔ 2016], p. 129 (150-157); idem, ‘The Protection against Unjustified 
Dismissal as a Fundamental Human Right’ [Η προστασία από την αδικαιολόγητη απόλυση ως θεμελιώδες 
δικαίωμα του ανθρώπου], Labour Law Review 76 (2017) [ΕΕργΔ 2017], p. 503 et seq.; D. Vassiliou, ‘Limitations 
on the Arbitrary Termination of Employment Contract on the Employer’s Initiative and Protection Against 
Arbitrary Dismissals’ [Περιορισμοί της αθέμιτης εργοδοτικής καταγγελίας και προστασία από την αθέμιτη 
απόλυση], Labour Law Review 76 (2017) [ΕΕργΔ 2017], p. 535 et seq.; idem, ‘The Impact of Article 24 of the 
Revised European Social Charter on the Greek Dismissal Law’ [Το άρθρο 24 του Αναθεωρημένου Ευρωπαϊκού 
Κοινωνικού Χάρτη και η επίδρασή του στο ελληνικό δίκαιο της καταγγελίας], Labour Law Review 76 (2017) 
[ΕΕργΔ 2017], p. 881 et seq. For an opposite view see I. Lixouriotis, Employment Law, 5th edition, 2017, p. 761-
762; G. Theodossis, ‘The Justified Termination of the Open-ended Employment Contract’ [Η αιτιολογημένη 
καταγγελία της σύμβασης εξαρτημένης εργασίας αορίστου χρόνου], Labour law Review 76 (2017) [ΕΕργΔ 2017], 
p. 527 et seq. 
